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THE FASCIST REFORM OF THE PENAL LAW
IN ITALY
GIULIo BATTAGLINI'

Defense of the Personality of the State
The Italian Penal Code of October 19, 1930 (in effect since
July 1, 1931) assumes a significance of first rank among all the legislative results of the Fascist Regime. It deals with one of the greatest
attributes of sovereignty, that is to say, the power to punish.
The law, in common with the realities of history everywhere,
must adapt itself to political ideas, to economic exigencies, and to the
social needs of a given country. The theory of government is reflected particularly in the penal law, because that is the most powerful
legal means which the government has at its disposal to achieve its
political objectives. It suffices to open the new Code and to glance
at Title I of Book II, with the heading "Crimes against the Personality of the State." The new crimes here defined (publication of prohibited news, anti-national activity abroad, seditious associations, etc.)
show that the Legislature has aimed to guard not only the minimal
interests which, in codes of other countries, bear the name "safety
of the State," but also, all the entirety of fundamental political interests represented by the State's personality.
Moreover, penal law has also a close relation to the moral law.
A penal code has been called "the moral code of a nation." That is
true, in the sense that the greater part of man's conduct which the
penal law considers (beyond those commands which help to enforce
the will of the State) represent disobedience to the moral precepts.
The State cannot do less than elevate (within limits) some moral
rules into legal rules, for a minimum of social 'morality is indispensable for the existence of the State. The typical and permanent nucleus of the penal law is thus composed of those precepts which are
not only declared by the State, but also are found written in every
person's conscience and are held sacred and inviolable in social life.
The perpetration of crimes which deny the essential dictates of morality arouses a reaction characteristic of the nation's conscience. This
moral reaction is not apparent in other crimes, especially in those
'Professor of the University of Pavia, Editor of the "Rivista Italiana di
diritto penale."
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known as misdemeanors, which represent often only an injury to certain interests which the Legislature for purposes of social order deems
to need the most active legal protection. The distinction between
these two groups of crimes has always been present. Even in primitive societies, where there had not arisen a separation between law
and religion, crimes of a profoundly immoral nature are regarded as
affronts to the gods and are to be atoned for with religious rites.
Responsibility in the New Code
In the enforcement of the penal law, there is one problem which
profoundly touches the nature of human action and the moral life:
is a person who commits a crime the master of his actions and therefore morally responsible, or is he an abnormal being? Should repression of such acts be the main consideration, or should the law
try also earnestly to remove the causes of the crime? Around these
points all the discussions of the penologists of the 19th century have
been centered. As Italians, we can take pride in claiming that the
rivalry between the Classical and the Positive schools in Italy (the
former represented by Luigi Lucchini, the latter by Enrico Ferri)
has been responsible among scholars and legislators throughout the
world for reconsidering the troublesome and difficult problems of
crime and punishment, and for pointing to new and more effective
protection against the destructive social acts of criminals.
The new Italian Penal Code marks a stage of capital historical
importance in the world-wide legislative movement, for it gives original, clear, and safe solutions to the problems which for half a century have harassed the scientific world. Our law, by tradition, is a
creation of juristic theory tempered by practical experience; whereas
the Anglo-American law is a product of empiricism enlightened by
rational principles. Nor has the Fascist reform of the Penal Code
parted from the method of penal legislation hitherto used. In all this
extensive and complicated task, as a reformer, the Minister of Justice,
Alfredo Rocco, wisely accepted the criterion that tradition embodies
truths of experience, which cannot be destroyed without destructive
consequences, but which should be developed and adapted to the new
needs of State and society. Thus the method of penal legislation
continued to be that of choosing, from among all possible categories,
a series of actions which are to be estimated from an ethico-legal
point of view, having the principle of responsibility as the basis. In
reality, only certain external actions of man are injurious to social life
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-and not particular subjective qualities of character conceived as existing in themselves.
It is here that the fundamental difference emerges between this
new Code of Rocco and the Draft Code of Ferri of 1921. Ferri's
Draft Code of 1921 met very active opposition because it eliminated
the principle of moral responsibility for human actions. The fundamental basis of Ferri's reform scheme was Article 18, which read:
"The principals and accesories in a crime are always legally responsible, except in cases where there is a justification for the act." Among
the penologists on the Code Commission (nominated by Chancellor
Mortara) two distinguished university professors, Alessandro Stoppato and Emanuele Carnevale, voicing public opinion, opposed the
maxim of Article 18; failing to secure its rejection, they resigned from
the Commission. But Ferri, who was the soul of the movement for
revision, and had a majority of followers in the Commission, could
not abandon that principle of the legal responsibility of ali persons,
without distinction between imputable and not imputable persons
(e. g., the insane) ; otherwise his code would no longer represent the
positivistic philosophy. For a positivistic penal code must deny the
moral character of human action. The positivism of the 19th century
had preached to us, to satiety, that the freedom of our acts is an illusion. According to positivism, we are what our temperament, our
physical make-up, our environment make us. We have not power
within us to free ourselves from the pressure of external phenomena
and to master them. Thus, according to Ferri's Draft, crime was nothing but the natural result of the complex of psychic, corporal, and
social conditions.
The reasoning by which Ferri sought to obtain approval of his
Draft, even by those who believed in the freedom of human actions,
was most insidious. He reasoned most cleverly. He asserted: "The
ascertainment and measure of moral responsibility are not realizable
by a human judge born of woman; it would require divine omniscience applied to every individual." This reasoning obtained widespread acceptance, especially in Latin-American countries, where science, because it is too new, still lacks the advantages of experience
and criticism.
For no one can maintain that Ferri's truth is verified by exact
science. It is an illusion of criminal positivism. The fact is rather
that even if several years were taken for trying a law-case (which in
itself would defeat the needs of justice, where promptness is required), one could never reach the truth, in the sense of mathematical
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exactness. That is because the subject of public justice is altogether
different from that of the physical sciences. And even if we deny the
moral character of human actions, as do Ferri and some of the South
American codes, and concede that the delinquent is not a morally
culpable being to be punished, but a socially dangerous one to whom
society merely applies corrective or therapeutic or eliminative measures, are we any better off? Can this criminal "dangerousness" of
an individual be determined and graduated with the same accuracy
with which one can establish a principle of physics? Not at all. For
whether our basic principle is responsibility or dangerousness, judicial
truth can never have an absolute value; it can have only empiric
value. Dangerousness (the Ferri key-concept) is after all a concept
subject to our limitations and ignorance. Not being able to know
what a man may do tomorrow, we are forced (to be sure, perhaps
inferring from certain facts) to estimate what his future conduct
will be-as, when the sky is covered with clouds, we say that it may
rain.
Popular opinion undoubtedly makes a clear distinction between
the culpable and the dangerous person. We may admit, of course,
that this idea of blame, which goes back to ancient myths and sagas,
and which nowadays still constitutes a basic idea of our civilization,
may be no more than a naive anti-scientific notion, destined to disappear in the beginning of our fourth millenium. But the idea of
blame, which we still attribute to some persons as guilty of crime
and not to others, is a fact which the legislator must take into account; otherwise he would be making a penal code which would be
the expression of the scientific conviction of a school, but would not
satisfy the public conscience and the needs of the State and society.
However, one may argue that the judge could at any rate inquire
and ascertain, in each case, whether the particular accused person,
at the moment in which he committed a crime, were in fact free or
not free to act as he did. But that is not the question which the
judge has to decide. For him the question is much more simple and,
at the same time, much more practical. The judge, to apply the
penalty has simply to find out whether and at what point the crime is
attributable to an act of the will, or on the contrary to the intervention
of other elements which eliminate or lessen its voluntariness. If he
find that the act is voluntary, he imposes the penalty. In doing so,
he has impliedly posited freedom (of the will) since the Legislature
cannot rationally concede the right of punishment except on the
assumption that will equals freedom. And the public conscience, of
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which the legislator represents an expression, rebels at the infliction
of punishment on a subject who could not but do what he did do.
How impossible it would be to compose a penal code on any
principle other than the moral (or voluntary) causation of the offender, is seen in that very draft Code of Ferri of 1921; for, though
starting with the conception of crime as a purely physiological action,
yet when he came to the concrete rules of detail, the author found
himself compelled to go back to the voluntary conception of human
action. Thus, in Article 12 of that draft the classical distincion between criminal intent and fault is reproduced; and Ferri in his report
explained that voluntariness alone is not sufficient; the act must be
done with intent.
The new Code decidedly inclines to the principle of fault and
punishment. Without being carried away by the theories of any one
school, it adheres, with great shrewdness, to the safe data of public
sentiment, which regards the principle of blame as a necessity in the
maintenance of the moral and legal system. And it may be added
that Ferri approved Rocco's first draft in 1927, and even conceded
the necessity of maintaining the principle of moral responsibility, out
of deference to the facts of public sentiment, in his lecture at the
University of Rome on November 22, 1927.
The new Code is based on the principle of individual responsibility, and on the distinction between responsible and irresponsible
persons. Article 85 states: "No one shall be punished for an act
defined by law as a crime if he was not responsible at the time he
committed the act. A person is responsible who has the capacity
to intend and to will." No man can, by his own act of will, determine to select among several purposes, unless he is already acquainted with them. "Nil volitum nisi praecognitum." Here the
difference between the capacity to intend and that to will becomes
apparent.
The capacity to intend comes into existence at that stage of
knowledge where an individual realizes the significance of his act as
harmful to certain interests protected by the penal law. It is analogous
to the "discernment" of Article 54 in Zanardelli's old code, defining
the responsibility of a minor between nine and fourteen years. It
represents an intellectual capacity, not a moral one. Moreover, for responsibility in Article 85 of the new Penal Code, a capacity to understand the moral significanec of his conduct is not necessary; thus, a
person lacking a moral sense is responsible.
The capacity to will is not the philosophic-moral question of free-
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will. It is the freedom of will as a fact of public conscience, independent of its philosophic basis. The law must be in accord with the
sentiments and conscience of the people, for it exists to satisfy the
social exigencies. Now no one can deny that, while science has by
no means demonstrated the freedom of the will, on the other hand the
popular conscience would rebel at penalizing a person who was forced
to do an act. The capacity to will, in the Code, is that normal condition of the mind in which, according to common conscience (for
absolute truth cannot be attainable here, as I have alerady pointed
out) a sufficient will power exists to resist impulses which may urge
him to commit punishable actions.
This distinction between the intelligential and the volitional elements of responsibility has a central value in the new Code, and is
reflected in the specific provisions. For example, in Article 43, defining the criminal intent, it is provided that the harmful and dangerous result must be "foreseen and willed by the actor as a consequence
of the very act or omission." That "foreseen" does not mean "premeditated," but means the foresight of the consequence, even though
for a single moment, as in impulsive homicide. Another example:
the original draft of 1927 omitted the idea of a continuous offense;
however, it was restored in the second draft, and it is preserved in
the new Code. On the other hand, Article 79 of Zanardelli's earlier
code treated as a single offense several violations of the same law,
though done at different times, if done in execution of the same decision of the will (theory of Mori, the author of the Tuscan penal
code). The new Code defines in Article 81 the continuous crime as a
series of acts done in execution of the same criminal design. In the
repealed Zanardelli code this provision had in mind the volitional and
deliberative element; in the new Code, the criterion is the intelligential
element. The latter seems more exact. A servant, for example, takes
repeatedly every Sunday some cigars from his master's cigar box;
this is continued theft, because the thefts, which would objectively be
many, become only one from a subjective point of view, due to the
same criminal design; and yet, each time the servant steals cigars
needs a new act of the will.
In most cases, the responsible person is also the dangerous one.
But then dangerousness is absorbed by responsibility; that is to say,
the fulfilment of the penalty serves also the purpose of repressing the
dangerousness. The principle of dangerousness assumes a value in
itself whenever dangerousness cannot be absorbed by responsibility,
i. c., where responsibility does not exist (e. g., insanity) or where
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circumstances require an additional and specific repression of dangerousness (e. g., habitual crime).
Public Safety
This brings us to that part of criminal law which we treat under
the term Public Safety.
One needs to distinguish between a dangerous persons and a
merely suspicious person. "Dangerousness" implies a judgment of
probability with respect to anti-social acts, while "suspicious" (which
figures only in certain police measures, e. g., Article 4, law of Public
Safety of June 18, 1931), is based on the mere possibility of such
acts. That the Penal Code, as far as it concerns itself with safety
measures (upon which I must pause a moment, after having spoken
about penalties), is dealing exclusively with dangerousness in a narrow sense, and not also to mere suspicion, is plainly seen in Article
203, where it is expressly stated that a person is socially dangerous
"when it is probable that he may commit new actions which are defined by law as crimes." The limit thus placed on the concept of
dangerousness, to the plain exclusion of mere "suspiciousness," calls
in practice for a prudent consideration of all circumstances of the
concrete case. Note that the Code does not make the quality of
dangerousness depend on the existence of individual anomalous traits.
Otherwise, why could we not demand an examination of the skull of
a delinquent, since criminal anthropologists affirm that in that way
they could find signs of propensities for the crime? But one would
have to kill the accused first, in order to find out, according to more
or less doubtful tests of science, if he were dangerous or not!
If the Penal Code does not prove efficient enough for delinquency,
one need not conclude that the penal law is futile, and that it would
be better to replace it with a prophylactic and therapeutic regime of
hospitals and health resorts! We may rather ask, "Will not the penalties perhaps be too light?" This is just the question that Minister
Rocco asked himself. So, pursuant to the increased authority of the
State, the draftsman believed it prudent to adopt a more severe criterion in fixing the maximum and minimum punishments. The increases of penalties have been adopted not only on those considerations
of political and social protection which might be suitable in any State
whatsoever; they rest also on the whole political, moral, religious,
and social concept of Fascism. Thus, for example, the new code
justly emphasizes more vigorous protection of the moral values of the
family, which (as is known to all) went through a critical period of
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danger just after the war. With this emphasis in mind, Article 559
does not seem excessive in imposing two years (maximum) of imprisonment for living in adultery (as distinguished from a mere act
of adultery). This might seem too severe, judged by the former
democratic and divorce-favoring standard; for adultery was regarded
as a customary and negligible matter in modem society (it was even
encouraged in the French comedy-literature), and was expected to
be eliminated from the criminal code and treated merely as a ground
for divorce.
On the other hand, in spite of a basically more severe attitude,
the new Code, in all cases where there is reason to be indulgent, has
been made more mild than the former one. What has happened is
that numerous classes of special circumstances are made to reduce
or even to eliminate the penalties, by taking better account of human
nature, so as to loosen the rigidity of general rules and allow the judge
to deal with individual cases by a liberal application of equitable
principles.
A penal code which is formulated after a period of revolution or
rebellion, is always obliged to consider the question of the deathpenalty. The long history of the question of capital punishment is
known to all, so I shall not repeat it. One's opinion hereon is largely
determined by individual temperament. But it is certain that the
legislature of any particular period may well, for high reasons of
public order and common welfare, deem it necessary to preserve that
penalty. No one can deny that capital punishment is capable of being
efficient. In the new Code, the death-penalty is retained as a measure
applicable to certain deeds estimated from an ethico-legal point of
view, on the basic principle of responsibility.
The Penalty as a Preventive
The Ferri Draft of 1921 did not use the terms "penalties" or
"measures of safety," but only "sanctions." These famous "sanctions" were nothing else than measures of safety, that is, coercive
means of cure and correction which were to replace the classical
"punishment." Even the "Zweckstrafe" (purposive punishment) proposed by Liszt in Germany (but not accepted in any of the various
drafts for reforming the German penal code) is not a punishment
in the real sense of the word, but only a precaution of law. Minister
Rocco, in his speech in the Senate of 1925, said, "I believe in the
legal and social necessity of penalties, for penalties are not made only
for delinquents. Penalties are made for all, because their essential
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function is to hold in sight of all citizens a threat of consequences,
which operates powerfully as a psychologic motive, and does cause
most citizens to observe the law." Certainly the idea of crime as a
disease to be cured, in different ways according to the subject, under-

mines the stem rigor which the social order needs for checking evil
inclinations and for aiding weak virtues. The Code penalties, therefore, cannot cease to be a means of punishment. If they did so,
they would not be penalties anymore, but only a method of cure and
correction. In that event, there would no longer be any penal code
(0 happy days!), but only a sort of hygienic measure of criminal
prophylaxis and therapeutics.
It is true that, in the opinion of most criminalists and experts
in prison matters, one finds more and more emphasized, in modern
times a tendency, in the employment of penalties (while preserving
the idea of punishment), to regard as most important the idea of
specific prevention, that is, of the reformation and moral regeneration
of the offender. Reformation cannot be made the only aim of penalties, else they would no longer be penalties and would no longer serve
the purposes of social discipline. But the correct solution of the problem is to consider reformation of the individual as a secondary purpose of penalties. The general object is to obtain the observance of
certain rules of conduct essential for social life by all those persons
(we know not exactly how many they are) who would not obey the
State if the State merely formulated certain rules, but did not enforce them with appropriate measures.
The regulation for Penal Institutions, approved by Decree of
June 18, 1931, No. 787 (highly important for the study of the Italian
penal system), was based on a larger attention to the reformation
principle, and effected a complete renovation of our penitentiary system by basing it on the idea of work and moral assistance. The Rocco
Code, in dealing with prison penalties, endeavored specially to obtain
good moral results by combining penalties and measures of safety
in such a way as to render possible the application of both methods
for the same individual. It is of course necessary that the transition
from penalty to measure of safety should be not hasty, sudden, and
inconsistent. In the new system, the penalty must aid in attaining
the purposes of the measure of safety.
Our penal reform has faith in the moral regeneration of the
criminal. While it is severe, it is at the same time human, and treads
safely the path of modem needs in penitentiary methods. Worthy
of special mention is the improvement in sentences to the penitentiary,
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the "tomb of the living," in the old Zanardelli Code. Article 22 of
Rocco's Code, marks a progressive step of greatest historical importance for civic progress: "A person condemned to the penitentiary
who has served at least three years of the sentence may be allowed
to work outside. This permission to work outside is subject to the
decision of a new judicial functionary, the "Supervisory Judge," to
whom the new law assigns specifically the admifistrative supervision of prison penalties.
A salient feature of the new Penal Code is to render more flexible and therefore more efficient the repression of crime, increasing
the discretion powers of the trial judge. The judge has the power
to increase the fine for those who are financially able; to add a fine
to imprisonment for crimes committed for the sake of gain; to lessen
the penalty, where more than one person is involved in the crime,
for the less culpable of those involved; to choose in many cases between fine and imprisonment; to combine penalties, in suitable cases;
etc., etc. These discretional powers are particularly broad in the employment of "measures of safety."
The personal attainments of the magistrate will now have to be
notably broadened. He will need qualities of culture, of sagacity, of
penetration, in a greater degree than before, in order to assemble
wisely all the considerations that affect his duty under the new Code.
He must, in short, be something like the English judge. Juristic
culture and mentality he must have most of all. Technical legal knowledge, though indispensable, will alone not suffice for his new function
in penal justice, for this is more complex and difficult than civil and
commercial justice. Crime must be studied in many aspects other than
the legal categories; morality, psychology, sociology, medicine, etc.,
all have a bearing. Under the new Code, the judge must possess in
the highest degree technical aptitude and knowledge in the auxiliary
fields of penal law.
Measures of Sa7ety
The so-called "measure of safety" forms one of the most prominent features of the new code; it may be termed the question of the
period in our affairs. Rocco's Code devotes to it all of title VIII of
Book I. The "measure of safety" is based on the principle of "dangerousness," in the sense above explained. It is applicable in those
cases where the principle assumes an intrinsic value, distinct from
that of responsibility. A penalty is a reaction against particular acts
estimated from an ethico-legal point of view according to the degree
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of guilt, and becomes thus a problem of justice. A "measure of
safety" is an administrative precaution that does not seek to settle
a question of justice, but serves only as a defense of society against
some danger arising from particular persons because of their abnormal subjective conditions. This means of indirect prevention"
against crime was also found in the old Zanardelli Code (committal
to an asylum, or to a house of correction, or to an inebriate asylum,
etc.) ; but its use was very limited. The new Code has the merit
of treating this method in a separate organic part, with precise definitions and wider use, governed by special rules. In these days, only
countries lacking the necessary technical apparatus (psychiatric, pedagogical, etc.), as, for example, China (which adopted a new penal
code in 1928 but still possesses only learned penologists), can afford
to let their criminal code remain based exclusively on penalties.
This system of "measures of safety" may be regarded as the one
useful remnant taken over from the positivist School's Code. It is
based on the fact that there are many cases of socially dangerous
acts against which the classical system of penalties does not give
sufficient protection. It suffices to recall that there are persons who
have been convicted as many as fifty times, and that these persons,
under the old Zanardelli Code (which thus is really philo-criminal),
would continually be restored to social life. The soundness of a code
may be tested by its treatment of recidivists. The casual offender
is humiliated by the penalty; he may regain his self-respect; he may
find, in the remembrance of the offense, a strong motive to remain
honest, and, perhaps, to be better than others. Not so, necessarily,
the habitual offender. In the Rocco Code, the habitual delinquent,
after having served a penalty increased for his prior offenses, is
subjected to a measure of safety (farm or labor colony) for a period
of two years at least. The code is plainly not fatalistic, but has faith
in moral 'regeneration. The "measure of safety" ceases upon a reconsideration of the offender's dangerousness by the Supervisory
Judge. The offender may then be given his liberty, subject to supervision or to giving security for good conduct. In Australia, after
the adoption of an analogous system for habitual delinquents, the
diminution in all crime figures was such that the prison population
was reduced by about twenty per cent. This shows that the active
defense of society against its most harmful elements, by means of the
two-fold system of penalties and measures of safety, results in a
definite decrease of the expense of prison administration.
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With this inclusion of "measures of safety" in the Code, the
scope of the penal or criminal law is not widened in any way. It
remains what it always has been, that is, a system based on the
principle of responsibility, absolutely homogeneous and without any
intrusion whatsoever of any foreign elements. Eclecticism, in the
method followed by Minister Rocco, is excluded. What it does is
this: Alongside of the rules of penal law is placed a system of
measures of criminal prophylaxis, forming (by definition of the legislator himself), a part of administrative law. The "measures of safety"
are best placed in the Penal Code, rather than in a special law, because of their close relation and the convenience of putting them under
the same judicial authority that has jurisdiction of the crimes.
These "measures of safety" belong really to the police power,
which is a branch of the administrative; they are precautions of police
safety that consist in indirect prevention. They have the same legal
status as the measures of indirect prevention contained by the Law
of Public Safety; but they are distingushed from the latter through
their limited and specific object, which is that of indirectly preventing crimes, not unlawful acts of any sort whatsoever. The above
mentioned Regulation for Penal Institutions of June 18, 1931, illustrates best, from the practical point of view (which is the most important thing), the distinction between penalties and measures of
safety. This is not the place to elaborate its details; it may be noted
merely that persons detained as a "measure of safety" are called by
their surnames (not by a serial number) ; that the work assigned them
is of a special character (suited to fit the object of their detention) ;
that they may be given leaves of absence; and that in other ways
their status is distinctly marked.

